

[Doc. No. 23]

Copy.

February 12, 1895.

Sir:-

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter and to inform you that I accept the proposals which you have made to me, accordingly I shall take possession to-morrow of all your ships, forts and other war materials, which are left in your hands. As to the hour and other conditions, I shall be glad to make arrangements with you to-morrow at the time when I shall receive a decisive answer to this my present letter. When the above mentioned material of war have been delivered up to me, I shall then be willing to make any of my ships conduct all the persons mentioned in your letter including yourself to a safe place convenient for both parties in perfect security, but were I to state my personal views and feelings to you, I would beckon you as I had done so in my last letter to come over to our side and wait in my country the termination of the present war, not only for your own safety but also for the future interest of your own country. I consider it far more preferable that you would render yourself to my country where you are sure to be treated with care and attention. However if it is your intention to rejoin your country I leave it entirely to your choice. As to your desire to make the Admiral Commanding in Chief of the British Squadron as a guarantee on your behalf I consider it unnecessary, it is your military honour in which I place my confidence. In conclusion let me inform you that I shall be waiting for your answer to my present letter at 10 o'clock to-morrow morning.

(Signed) I.A. Ito,
Vice Admiral--Commander-in-Chief.

TERMS OF CAPITULATION OF WEI HAI WEI.

Admiral Ting, Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Squadron, having sent, on the morning of the 12th of February, 1895, to His Majesty's Ship "Matsushima" Captain Ching under a white flag, with the letter of Admiral Ting, of the same date, addressed to Admiral Ito, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Squadron, to the effect that Admiral Ting will deliver up to Admiral Ito all the vessels, forts, and material of war now present on the Island of Lin Tun Taw, ^(Lin Tun Taw) on the condition of Admiral Ito agreeing to save the lives of the Chinese and foreign officers and men belonging to the Chinese Army and Navy, and--

Admiral Ito having agreed to the terms on the whole and proposing to make arrangements for fixing the hour and other numerous conditions of carrying out the Capitulation, at 10 o'clock, a.m., 13th of February, 1895, in a letter given as answer to the above letter of Admiral Ting: and--

Admiral Ting again sending Captain Ching under a white flag to this His Majesty's Ship Matsushima, on the morning of the 13th of February, 1895 with the letter of Admiral Ting dated 12th of February (18th of January Chinese Calendar) addressed to Admiral Ito thanking him for having agreed to save the lives of men under him and asking him to postpone the delivery of the vessels, forts, and materials of war and the entrance of the Japanese forces into the Island of ^(Lin Tun Taw) Lin Tun Taw till the 16th of February (22 January Chinese Calendar) in order to give him time and the said Chinese and foreign officers and men to prepare for their departure, assuming at the same time that the said vessels, forts, and materials of war to be delivered shall be kept in their present condition and that the provisions shall be punctually fulfilled: and--

The communication having been made verbally by Captain Ching that Admiral Ting and the two principal officers next to him have committed suicide on the night of the 12th of February, 1895 (18th of January Chinese Calendar) after having written the above letter, Admiral Ito gave to Captain Ching a written proposal to the follow-

ing effect:-

13th February, 1895/
His Majesty's Ship Matsushima.

To the

Officers representing the Chinese Fleet at Wei Hai Wei.

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of the letters of Admiral Ting dated the 18th of January of the Chinese Calendar.

The report of the death of Admiral Ting last night, communicated verbally by the messenger who brought over the same letters, I receive with great personal regret. As to the postponing the receipt of the vessels, forts, and other materials of war until the 22 January of the Chinese year I am ready to comply with under conditions. This condition is that some responsible Chinese officer should come over to this ship, our flagship Matsushima, before six o'clock p.m. this day, the 13th February, according to the Japanese year and make arrangements with upon several points which have to be fixed with certitude regarding the receiving of said vessels, forts, and materials of war as well as the escorting of the Chinese and foreign officers and men out of Wei Hai Wei. In my last letter to the lamented Admiral Ting it was said, "As to the hour and other minor conditions I shall be glad to make arrangements with you tomorrow", and now that he is dead these minor conditions have to be arranged with somebody who can deal with us in his stead. It is my express wish that the said officer who comes to this our flagship for the above purpose be a Chinese not a foreign officer and be it understood I am willing to receive him with honor.

(signed) Admiral Ito

Commander-in-Chief Japanese Squadron.

Toward 5 o'clock p.m. of the 13th of February, 1895, Taotai Neu accompanied by Captain Ching came under a white flag to this His Majesty's Ship Matsushima and Taotai Neu introduced himself as the representative of the Naval and Military forces of Wei Hai Wei.

He was received with honor by Admiral Ito

Admiral Ito then proposed to Taotai Neu several conditions relating to the receiving of vessels, forts and materials of war, the escorting of the Chinese and foreign officers and men out of Wei Hai Wei, etc., and after a consultation of several hours Taotai Neu and Captain Ching left the ship on condition that they return to the ship again before 2 o'clock p.m. on the 14th of February, 1895.

Taotai Neu came again under a white flag, accompanied by Captain Ching, at 2 o'clock p.m. of the 14th of February, 1895 and was received with honor by Admiral Ito. After further consultation the following terms were agreed upon between the two parties as conditions of capitulation and were signed by Admiral Ito and Taotai Neu, this selfsame version in English being to serve as the original text:-

Art. 1. That a list of names, of functions and ranks of all the naval and military officers, both Chinese and foreign, required to be transported in safety, should be produced. For foreigners, their nationalities should also be mentioned; as to soldiers, clerks, etc. only their numbers should be given.

Art. 2. That all naval and military officers, both native and foreign should pledge themselves by a formal writing that they shall not re-engage themselves in the present war between China and Japan.

Art. 3. That all the weapons, powder, and projectiles for use of the land forces on the Island of Lin Tun Taw ^(Lun Kuny Jao) should be collected in fixed places and those places made known to us. The soldiers of the said land forces should be landed at Chu Tao and from thence they are to be conducted by the Japanese guards to the outposts of the Japanese Army now occupying the localities around Wei Hai Wei. The landing to begin from 5 o'clock p.m. 14th of February, 1895, (20 January Chinese Calendar) and end before noon of the 15th of February, 1895, (21 January Chinese Calendar)

Art. 4. That Taotai Neu, representing the Chinese naval and military forces at Wei Hai Wei with responsibility should appoint

a suitable number of committies for the delivery of the vessels and forts. Those committies are required to send in before noon, 15 February, 1895, a list of the arms and forts in their charge with the number and kinds of guns, rifles and other weapons now contained in those vessels or forts.

Art. 5. That the Chinese naval and military officers and men, native and foreign, shall be allowed to leave Wei Hai Wei after noon of the 16th of February, 1895 (22 January Chinese Calendar) in the steamer Kuang Chi sailing out of harbor under condition stipulated in article X.

Art. 6. That the Chinese naval and military forces both native and foreign, shall be allowed to take with them their personal property movable only, with the exception of weapons which are to be delivered even if they be private property. Whenever deemed necessary the things they take away shall be submitted to inspection.

Art. 7. That the permanent residents, i.e., the original inhabitants of the Island of Lin Tun Taw ^(Lin Tung Tao) shall be persuaded to continue their residence on the Island.

Art. 8. That the landing of the requisite number of officers and men on the Island of Lin Tun Taw ^(Lin Tung Tao) in order to take possession of the forts and materials of war on the island shall commence from 9 o'clock a.m. of the 16th of February, 1895, (22 January Chinese Calendar) but that Admiral Ito reserves to himself the right to send in a certain number of Japanese Men-of-War into the harbor whenever the necessity occurs anytime after the signing of the present stipulations. The naval officers both native and foreign on board the Chinese vessels may remain therein until 9 o'clock a.m. of the 16th of February, 1895, (22 January Chinese Calendar) / Those marines, soldiers, and seamen, etc. on board the same vessels that wished to be escorted out of Wei Hai Wei, inland, should be landed on the same place and escorted in the same way as the land forces. The landing being to begin from the noon of the 15th of February, 1895

(21 January Chinese Calendar) that is to say after the landing of the land forces is finished.

Art. 9. The women, children, aged persons, and other non-combatants that wish to leave the Island of Lin Tun Taw should be allowed to sail out of the eastern or western mouth of the harbor in Chinese junks any time after the morning of the 15th of February, 1895 (21 January Chinese Calendar) Their vessels are however to be examined by the Japanese naval officers and men in the torpedo boats or other boats posted at the mouths of the harbor, the examination extending over both persons and baggage.

Art. 10. That the coffins of the lamented Admiral Ting and the officers next to him should be allowed to be carried out of the harbor after noon of the 16th of February, 1895 (22 January Chinese Calendar) and before the noon of the 23rd of February, 1895, (24 January Chinese Calendar) in the steamship Kuang Chi which Admiral Ito desists from taking possession of and lays at the disposal of Taotai Neu as representing the Chinese navy and army at Wei Hai Wei, solely out of respect to the soul of Admiral Ting who did his duty toward his country. The said steamship Kuang Chi to be inspected by the Japanese naval officers on the morning of the 16th of February 1895, (21 January Chinese Calendar) to assure that she is not equipped as a war vessel.

Art. 11. That it be always understood that the Chinese naval and military forces at Wei Hai Wei are to give up all hostile operations against the Japanese naval and military forces and that the moment such operations are made the previous stipulations shall lose affect at once and the Japanese naval and military forces shall resume hostility.

(signed) Taotai Neu
Admiral Ito.

Done on the 14th February, 1895 (20 January Chinese Calendar) on board His Majesty's Ship Matsushima.

No. 28.
S.N.

ASIATIC STATION.

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

U. S. Naval force.

U. S. Flagship Baltimore,

Chefoo, China,

February 13, 1895.

Sir:-

1. I have the honor to report that a combined land and sea attack was made upon Wei-Hai-Wei by the Japanese forces on the 30th ultimo, and that the "YORKTOWN" was sent to that vicinity to obtain all possible information in regard to the operations.

2. Pending the fall of Wei-Hai-Wei, and during the interval occupied by the numerous engagements that have taken place, the vessels of the various nationalities that are represented in Chefoo have been constantly going to and from the scene of the fighting, bringing such news as could be obtained. Reliable information as to the definite results has been very difficult to get, owing to the fact that the neutral vessels, naturally, were required to keep out of range of the belligerents, and the heavy smoke caused by the discharge of the guns, screened the actual conditions from the observers.

3. The appended sketch of the vicinity of Wei-Hai-Wei, will be of assistance in following the movements of the combatants, and in understanding fully the conditions that existed. The points to the eastward and westward of the entrances, together with Leu Kung,

the other small island ,and the hills back of the harbor ,were strongly fortified;modern guns of heavy caliber being mounted. The channels to the harbor were supposed to be more or less filled with torpedoes,while the eastern one was further barricaded by a boom. The Chinese fleet composed of six or seven men of war and thirteen torpedo boats remained in the harbor,protected in a great measure by the guns of the several forts.The battle ships "TING YUEN" and "CHEN YUEN"were most formidable antagonists for the unarmored ships of the Japanese. On the morning of January 30th the Japanese army with siege guns,attacked the forts on the eastern (Three peak)point while the Navy threw forward(close inshore) a division of seven smaller vessels and a number of torpedo boats,the main fleet composed of the "MATSUSHIMA"(Flag),"CHIYODA","HASHIDATE","ITSUKUSHIMA","FUSO"(Second in Command),"HIYEI";"KONGO","TAKAO","YOSHINO","NANIWA" "AKITSUSHIMA",and "TACHACHIHO",was formed in three divisions well outside,and apparently simply watched the action,for it was noticed that the covers were not taken off the guns of these vessels. The Japanese stormed the eastern forts,the firing beginning from fleet and shore at about 8.30 a.m. One of the forts was blown up about 12,10 p.m. and shortly after this the Japanese were in possession of the two remaining ones on that side.After they had manned the guns of one of the captured forts,a Chinese battle ship steamed close up and by a well directed fire silenced the guns that the Japanese had opened on Leu kung island.In this engagement it is reported that the Japanese lost about 300,and the Chinese about 700.

This ended the day's engagement, the fleet returning to an anchorage for the night. On January 31st, the Japanese fleet of twenty seven vessels-in all-renewed the attack, firing at long range, the Army at the same time operating from shoreward; the firing continued until about 1 p.m., but the heavy smoke prevented the observers from seeing the result of the fire. In the afternoon the weather became very threatening, and the fleet stood to sea. A heavy gale from the Nd. and Wd. set in, and continued until the morning of the 3d instant, with bitterly cold weather, and heavy blinding snow squalls at frequent intervals. This weather interfered very much with the operations; the torpedo boats in particular suffering from the effects of the cold, being covered with ice from end to end. By a series of land operations-the fleet assisting with heavy gun fire, the forts were taken one by one, until on the afternoon of the 4th, the Japanese held all the forts on the main land; the Chinese retaining their fleet and the island forts. On the same night the Chinese battle ships opened on the forts that had been captured and manned by the Japanese and drove them from the guns, and one Japanese torpedo boat was disabled. The Japanese had succeeded in towing away the obstructing torpedo boom, and on the night of the 5th, their torpedo boats made a dash into the harbor and succeeded in torpedoing three of the Chinese fleet; the "TING YUEN" (Flag), "LAI YUEN", and "TSI YUEN", also the training ship "WRI-YUEN". The "Ting YUEN" was run into shoal water and is reported sunk to the upper deck; while the other vessels are either sunk or disabled. The Japanese fleet

on the morning of the 7th, made an attempt to finish the work but retired before penetrating the harbor very far, the "MATSUSHIMA" having -as reported-a casualty list of fourteen people, while three other vessels were struck. The small island fort was abandoned by the Chinese, and the "CHIH YUEN" was sunk by the fire of the forts that had been captured by the Japanese, so that practically Wei-Hai-Wei was in their possession. The Chinese torpedo boats deserting their comrades made an attempt to escape, and left the harbor in a body to seek refuge elsewhere, of these boats ten were driven on the beach not far from the port-these it is reported have been recovered by the Japanese. -while two were seen at about 10 a.m. coming up the coast at full speed with the "YOSHINO" and "TACHACHIHO" in pursuit. They rounded the bluff on the other side of Chefoo anchorage, and the leading boat succeeded in reaching the beach, but the second one, that could not keep up the necessary speed, was sunk by the fire of the "YOSHINO". It is now but a matter of time when the Japanese will take possession of Leu kung island and the remnant of the Chinese fleet. Admiral Ito apparently considers that the Chinese are in a position from which they cannot escape, and he does not care to risk his unarmored ships unnecessarily to the fire of the "CHEN YUEN" and the fort; when the opportunity offers he will probably end the affair very quickly. Absolutely accurate information in regard to the details of the engagements and the damages inflicted cannot be obtained until such time as the Intelligence officers can be sent to gather the required data.

About twenty five hundred deserters from the Chinese forts have appeared at Chefoo, but everything was prepared to use strong measures with this supposed disturbing element; these men, however, have given no trouble. Probably they were aware of the precautions that had been taken for International cooperation, and concluded it would not be wise to give any cause for a use of force by the foreigners.

5. The excessively cold weather with the Northerly gale caused a great deal of ice to find its way into the harbor, rendering boating exceedingly difficult and even hazardous. A boat from this vessel and one from H.B.M.S. SEVERN, were caught in the ice, and the crews were weather bound on shore for forty-eight hours. The "BALTIMORE'S" boat received no damage.

6. On February 6th, I received from the United States Consular Agent at Chefoo, a communication (copy enclosed marked 1.) relating to some American missionaries that desired to be rescued at San San Saddle, and brought to Chefoo. The "CHARLESTON" sailed at 4.30 a.m. February 7th, in response to this request, and returned to Chefoo at 2 p.m. February 8th. Although the assistance of a ship had been requested, and the missionaries had been directed to assemble at San San Saddle by a certain day-when a vessel would come to their assistance- only a part of the large number expected, appeared to take advantage of the opportunity for rescue. I enclose (marked 2) a copy of the report of the Commanding Officer. Captain Coffin performed most efficient service on this occasion, and evidently

handled the "CHARLESTON" most ably. On the 9th instant the following telegram was received from Consul General Jernigan: "Missionaries want ship at Nantung-wei 13th for transportation are in danger Jernigan". Nantung-wei is shown on H.O. chart 1443 about 280 miles to the Sd. of Chefoo, but no charts show any soundings at that place; in consequence of which a telegram was sent the Consul General to that effect, and directing that the missionaries ~~to~~ go to Tower point a few miles up the coast. This information could not be communicated as the party had started for Nantung-wei. The "YORKTOWN" sailed at 4.10 a.m. February 12th on this mission.

7. In connection with the subject of American missionaries, I beg leave to call the attention of the Department to the difficulties experienced in endeavoring to get these people to place themselves out of reach of danger. At best the obstacles in the way of rendering assistance are numerous, and these have been increased in a great degree by the missionaries themselves. As a class they are thoroughly helpless and irresponsible as far as taking precautions are concerned, and by their lack of unanimity of action would defeat the best laid plans for their rescue. The Consular Agent in Chefoo, and the Commander-in-Chief have been most urgent in their reiterated admonitions to the missionaries in the outlying districts to seek refuge in Chefoo, where ample protection could be afforded. That this should have been done before the rigor of winter made traveling a hardship, and the advent of the Japanese increased the danger from the ignorant, disorderly element of the Chinese lower

classes, requires no comment. The missionaries appear to have no conception of a state of war. As long as the danger appears to them remote they disregard all advice, preferring to remain to care for their worldly possessions, rather than to prepare for possible contingencies. When it becomes almost too late, and they find themselves confronted with dangerous conditions, they appeal with pitiful energy for assistance, and start aimlessly for the coast hoping for aid and succor. To them the presence of ice along the shore and the absence of soundings on the chart mean nothing, as long as they reach the seaboard at any time they apparently think their responsibility ended. The hazardous duty for which the "CHARLESTON" was ordered could only be justified by the supposed imminent danger to a number of defenseless fellow countrymen and women. Within twenty-four hours of the return of the party on the "CHARLESTON", the Consul informed me that some others - that had not thought it necessary to go to San San Saddle, would probably require assistance. Some of those that were brought from Teng ehov by the "YORKTOWN", have returned to that place, notwithstanding their recent experience and the unsettled conditions that still exist. I forward for the information of the Department copies (marked 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.) of certain communications that are pertinent to this subject.

8. H.B.M.S. PORPOISE arrived from Chemulpo on the 3d instant, and reports everything quiet in that vicinity. I have had no communications of any description from the United States Minister at Seoul, since the "BALTIMORE" sailed from Chemulpo.

9. The American residents at Ningpo were alarmed at the condition of affairs there; the Taotai having informed the Consul that no American man-of-war would be permitted to visit the city. An outbreak was feared during the Chinese New Year holidays, as during this period the steamers plying from Shanghai are hauled off. This was the cause for the application by Consul General Jernigan that the "CONCORD" might be shown at Ningpo. That city had been declared closed to foreign men-of-war, and torpedoes had been placed as a means of defense in addition to the forts. H.B.M.S. REDPOLE, had been permitted to visit the city after this declaration, but the Chinese authorities stated that this was to be considered as an exception. The "CONCORD" appeared off Ningpo and was informed that the port was closed. Commander Craig quietly but firmly insisted that as an English man-of-war had been accorded the privilege of going in, the same must be extended to a public vessel of the United States, that he proposed to take the "CONCORD" up the next day, and desired to be furnished with a pilot for that purpose. The pilot was forthcoming, the "CONCORD" went to Ningpo, and remained during the holidays, every thing being quiet. I enclose a copy (marked 8) of a communication from the U.S. Consul at Ningpo that explains itself.

10. No later reports, other than those furnished the Department, have been received from the "MONOCACY" or "PETREL", the natural inference being that there is no change in the existing conditions at Tientsin, or Newchwang.

11. The following men-of-war are at anchor off chefoo, British,
"CENTURION", UNDAUNTED"; SEVERN", "EDGAR", "PORPOISE" and "ALACRITY",
"BALTIMORE", CHARLESTON", French : "ISLY", BEAUTEMPS BEAUPRE'": German;
"ARCONA": Italian "UMBRIA": Russian "KREITZER".

12. The mail communication with Japan is still a matter of
the greatest uncertainty, and it is through the courtesy of the
Commanding Officer of H.B.M.S. EDGAR, sailing for Nagasaki that I
am enabled to forward mail.

I have the honor to be, Sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

C. C. Carpenter
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,

Commanding U.S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station.

The Secretary of the Navy,

Washington, D.C.

(Bureau of Navigation).

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THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR TO THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
1894-1905



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JULES DAVIDS, Editor

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